UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000
AUG 30 2006
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE
AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES
Subject: Implementation of Adjudicative Guidelines for
Determining Eligibility For Access to Classified
Information (December 29, 2005)
This memorandum directs the implementation of the attached revised
Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to
Classified Information (December 29, 2005), as modified, effective
September 1, 2006.
The revised Guidelines supersede the memorandum issued by the former
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications,
and Intelligence dated August 16, 2000, Subject: Guidance to DoD
Central Adjudication Facilities (CAF) Clarifying the Application
of the Foreign Preference Adjudicative Guideline.
The attachment incorporates the provisions of the "Smith Amendment,"
Section 986 of Title 10 of the United States Code, as amended. The
Smith Amendment provides authority to grant an exception to the
prohibition concerning persons convicted of a crime, sentenced to
a term exceeding one year, and incarcerated for not less than one
year, or who have been discharged or dismissed from the Armed Forces
under dishonorable conditions. An exception to the Smith Amendment
for the persons described above is only authorized by a designated
waiver authority in meritorious cases where mitigating factors exist
that are consistent with the mitigating factors described in the
attached Adjudicative Guidelines.
The waiver authority formerly held by the Secretary of Defense
is now delegated to the Director, Washington Headquarters Services
(WHS) or designee, for its employees and those entities serviced
by WHS; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) or designee,
for its employees and those entities serviced by DIA; the Director,
National Security Agency (NSA) or designee, for its employees and
those entities serviced by NSA; the Director, Defense Office of
Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) or designee, for an officer or employee
of a DoD contractor serviced by DOHA; and the Secretaries of the
Military Departments or designee. Waiver authority may not be further
delegated to a member of the Component Personnel Security Appeal
Board or the DOHA Security Clearance Appeal Board.
The revised Guidelines apply to all adjudications and other determinations
made under the Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5220.6, January
2, 1992, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program, and the DoD Personnel Security Program, DoD 5200.2-R, January
1, 1987. They replace the present guidelines published in Enclosure
Two to DoDD 5220.6 and Appendix Eight to DoD 5200.2-R. Military
Department and Defense Agency regulations should be revised in accordance
with this memorandum
The revised Guidelines apply to all adjudications and other determinations
in which a Statement of Reasons has not been issued by September
1, 2006. All adjudications and other determinations in which a Statement
of Reasons has been issued prior to September 1, 2006 will be made
under the current Guidelines.
Stephen A. Cambone
Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility
For Access to Classified Information
1. Introduction. The following adjudicative guidelines are established
for all U.S. government civilian and military personnel, consultants,
contractors, employees of contractors, licensees, certificate holders
or grantees and their employees, and other individuals who require
access to classified information. They apply to persons being considered
for initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information,
to include sensitive compartmented information and special access
programs, and are to be used by government departments and agencies
in all final clearance determinations. Government departments and
agencies may also choose to apply these guidelines to analogous
situations regarding persons being considered for access to other
types of protected information.
Decisions regarding eligibility for access to classified information
take into account factors that could cause a conflict of interest
and place a person in the position of having to choose between his
or her commitments to the United States, including the commitment
to protect classified information, and any other compelling loyalty.
Access decisions also take into account a person's reliability,
trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. No
coercive policing could replace the self¬discipline and integrity
of the person entrusted with the nation's secrets as the most effective
means of protecting them. When a person's life history shows evidence
of unreliability or untrustworthiness, questions arise whether the
person can be relied on and trusted to exercise the responsibility
necessary for working in a secure environment where protecting classified
information is paramount.
2. The Adjudicative Process.
(a) The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient
period of a person's life to make an affirmative determination that
the. person is an acceptable security risk. Eligibility for access
to classified information is predicated upon the individual meeting
these personnel security guidelines. The adjudication process is
the careful weighing of a number of variables known as the whole-person
concept. Available, reliable information about the person, past
and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in
reaching a determination. In evaluating the relevance of an individual's
conduct, the adjudicator should consider the following factors:
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;
(2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation;
(3) the frequency and recency of the conduct;
(4) the individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
(5) the extent to which participation is voluntary;
(6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent
behavioral changes;
(7) the motivation for the conduct;
(8) the potential for pressure, coercion,exploitation, or duress;
and
(9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence;
(b) Each case must be judged on its own merits, and final determination
remains the responsibility of the specific department or agency.
Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified
information will be resolved in favor of the national security.
(c) The ability to develop specific thresholds for action under
these guidelines is limited by the nature and complexity of human
behavior. The ultimate determination of whether the granting or
continuing of eligibility for a security clearance is clearly consistent
with the interests of national security must be an overall common
sense judgment based upon careful consideration of the following
guidelines, each of which is to be evaluated in the context of the
whole person.
(click on the links below to read the guidelines)
(1) GUIDELINE A: Allegiance to
the United States;
(2) GUIDELINE B: Foreign Influence
(3) GUIDELINE C: Foreign Preference;
(4) GUIDELINE D: Sexual Behavior;
(5) GUIDELINE E: Personal Conduct;
(6) GUIDELINE F: Financial Considerations;
(7) GUIDELINE G: Alcohol Consumption;
(8) GUIDELINE H: Drug Involvement;
(9) GUIDELINE I: Psychological
Conditions;
(10) GUIDELINE J: Criminal Conduct;
(11) GUIDELINE K: Handling Protected
Information;
(12) GUIDELINE L: Outside Activities;
(13) GUIDELINE M: Use of Information
Technology Systems
(d) Although adverse information concerning a single criterion
may not be sufficient for an unfavorable determination, the individual
may be disqualified if available information reflects a recent or
recurring pattern of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or
emotionally unstable behavior. Notwithstanding the whole-person
concept, pursuit of further investigation may be terminated by an
appropriate adjudicative agency in the face of reliable, significant,
disqualifying, adverse information.
(e) When information of security concern becomes known about an
individual who is currently eligible for access to classified information,
the adjudicator should consider whether the person:
(1) voluntarily reported the information;
(2) was truthful and complete in responding to questions;
(3) sought assistance and followed professional guidance, where
appropriate;
(4) resolved or appears likely to favorably resolve the security
concern;
(5) has demonstrated positive changes in behavior and employment;
(6) should have his or her access temporarily suspended pending
final adjudication of the information.
(f) If after evaluating information of security concern, the adjudicator
decides that the information is not serious enough to warrant a
recommendation of disapproval or revocation of the security clearance,
it may be appropriate to recommend approval with a warning that
future incidents of a similar nature may result in revocation of
access.
GUIDELINE A: ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES
3. The Concern. An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance
to the United States. The willingness to safeguard classified information
is in doubt if there is any reason to suspect an individual's allegiance
to the United States.
4. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
include:
(a) involvement in, support of, training to commit, or advocacy
of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, or sedition
against the United States of America;
(b) association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to
commit, or who are committing, any of the above acts;
(c) association or sympathy with persons or organizations that
advocate, threaten, or use force or violence, or use any other illegal
or unconstitutional means, in an effort to:
(1) overthrow or influence the government of the United States
or any state or local government;
(2) prevent Federal, state, or local government personnel from
performing their official duties;
(3) gain retribution for perceived wrongs caused by the Federal,
state, or local government;
(4) prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution
or laws of the United States or of any state.
5. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) the individual was unaware of the unlawful aims of the individual
or organization and severed ties upon learning of these;
(b) the individual's involvement was only with the lawful or humanitarian
aspects of such an organization;
(c) involvement in the above activities occurred for only a short
period of time and was attributable to curiosity or academic interest;
(d) the involvement or association with such activities occurred
under such unusual circumstances, or so much time has elapsed, that
it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's
current reliability, trustworthiness, or loyalty.
GUIDELINE B: FOREIGN INFLUENCE
6. The Concern. Foreign contacts and interests may be a security
concern if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial
interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person,
group, organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S.
interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign
interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider
the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact
or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to,
such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target
United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is
associated with a risk of terrorism.
7. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
include:
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident
in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country
that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's
obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the
individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country
by providing that information;
(c) counterintelligence information, that may be classified, indicates
that the individual's access to protected information may involve
unacceptable risk to national security;
(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless
of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened
risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
(e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in
a foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business,
which could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign
influence or exploitation;
(f) failure to report, when required, association with a foreign
national;
(g) unauthorized association with a suspected or known agent, associate,
or employee of a foreign intelligence service;
(h) indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign
country are acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual
to possible future exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure,
or coercion;
(i) conduct, especially while traveling outside the U.S., which
may make the individual vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or
coercion by a foreign person, group, government, or country.
8. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country
in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities
of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the
individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between
the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government
and the interests of the U.S.;
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's
sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government,
or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding
relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can
be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the
U.S. interest;
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual
and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create
a risk for foreign influence or exploitation;
(d) the foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government
business or are approved by the cognizant security authority;
(e) the individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements
regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons,
groups, or organizations from a foreign country;
(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial,
or property interests is such that they are unlikely to result in
a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate,
or pressure the individual.
GUIDELINE C: FOREIGN PREFERENCE
9. The Concern. When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate
a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then
he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions
that are harmful to the interests of the United States.
10. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
include:
(a) exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship
after becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship
of a family member. This includes but is not limited to:
(1) possession of a current foreign passport;
(2) military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign
country;
(3) accepting educational, medical, retirement, social welfare,
or other such benefits from a foreign country;
(4) residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements;
(5) using foreign citizenship to protect financial. or business
interests in another country;
(6) seeking or holding political office in a foreign country;
(7) voting in a foreign election;
(b) action to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign citizenship
by an American citizen;
(c) performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting,
so as to serve the interests of a foreign person, group, organization,
or government in conflict with the national security interest;
(d) any statement or action that shows allegiance to a country
other than the United States: for example, declaration of intent
to renounce United States citizenship; renunciation of United States
citizenship.
11. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) dual citizenship is based solely on parents' citizenship or
birth in a foreign country;
(b) the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual
citizenship;
(c) exercise of the rights, privileges, or obligations of foreign
citizenship occurred before the individual became a U.S. citizen
or when the individual was a minor;
(d) use of a foreign passport is approved by the cognizant security
authority.
(e) the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant
security authority, or otherwise invalidated;
(f) the vote in a foreign election was encouraged by the United
States Government.
GUIDELINE D: SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
12. The Concern. Sexual behavior that involves a criminal offense,
indicates a personality or emotional disorder, reflects lack of
judgment or discretion, or which may subject the individual to undue
influence or coercion, exploitation, or duress can raise questions
about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to
protect classified information. No adverse inference concerning
the standards in this Guideline may be raised solely on the basis
of the sexual orientation of the individual.
13. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
include:
(a) sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the individual
has been prosecuted;
(b) a pattern of compulsive, self-destructive, or high risk sexual
behavior that the person is unable to stop or that may be symptomatic
of a personality disorder;
(c) sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable
to coercion, exploitation, or duress;
(d) sexual behavior of a public nature and/or that reflects lack
of discretion or judgment.
14. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) the behavior occurred prior to or during adolescence and there
is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;
(b) the sexual behavior happened so long ago, so infrequently,
or under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur
and does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(c) the behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion, exploitation,
or duress. (d) the sexual behavior is strictly private, consensual,
and discreet.
GUIDELINE E: PERSONAL CONDUCT
15. The Concern. Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack
of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and
regulations can raise questions about an individual's reliability,
trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. Of
special interest is any failure to provide truthful and candid answers
during the security clearance process or any other failure to cooperate
with the security clearance process.
The following will normally result in an unfavorable clearance
action or administrative termination of further processing for clearance
eligibility:
(a) refusal, or failure without reasonable cause, to undergo or
cooperate with security processing, including but not limited to
meeting with a security investigator for subject interview, completing
security forms or releases, and cooperation with medical or psychological
evaluation;
(b) refusal to provide full, frank and truthful answers to lawful
questions of investigators, security officials, or other official
representatives in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness
determination.
16. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
include:
(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant
facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history
statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine
employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security
clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities;
(b) deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning
relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official,
competent medical authority, or other official government representative;
(c) credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue
areas that is not sufficient for an adverse determination under
any other single guideline, but which, when considered as a whole,
supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness,
unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules
and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person
may not properly safeguard protected information;
(d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered
under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for
an adverse determination, but which, when combined with all available
information supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment,
untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness
to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating
that the person may not properly safeguard protected information.
This includes but is not limited to consideration of:
(1) untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of client
confidentiality, release of proprietary information, unauthorized
release of sensitive corporate or other government protected information:
(2) disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior in the
workplace;
(3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations;
(4) evidence of significant misuse of Government or other employer's
time or resources;
(e) personal conduct, or concealment of information about one's
conduct, that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation,
or duress, such as (1) engaging in activities which, if known, may
affect the person's personal, professional, or community standing,
or (2) while in another country, engaging in any activity that is
illegal in that country or that is legal in that country but illegal
in the United States and may serve as a basis for exploitation or
pressure by the foreign security or intelligence service or other
group;
(f) violation of a written or recorded commitment made by the individual
to the employer as a condition of employment;
(g) association with persons involved in criminal activity.
17. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the
omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted
with the facts;
(b) the refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment
was caused or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate
advice of authorized personnel or legal counsel advising or instructing
the individual specifically concerning the security clearance process.
Upon being made aware of the requirement to cooperate or provide
the information, the individual cooperated fully and truthfully.
(c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the
behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances
that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's
reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling
to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate
the stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy,
unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is
unlikely to recur;
(e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate
vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress;
(f) the information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable
reliability;
(g) association with persons involved in criminal activity has
ceased or occurs under circumstances that do not cast doubt upon
the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, judgment, or willingness
to comply with rules and regulations.
GUIDELINE F: FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
18. The Concern. Failure or inability to live within one's means,
satisfy debts, and meet financial obligations may indicate poor
self-control, lack of judgment, or unwillingness to abide by rules
and regulations, all of which can raise questions about an individual's
reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information.
An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of having
to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. Compulsive gambling
is a concern as it may lead to financial crimes including espionage.
Affluence that cannot be explained by known sources of income is
also a security concern. It may indicate proceeds from financially
profitable criminal acts.
19. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
include:
(a) inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;
(b) indebtedness caused by frivolous or irresponsible spending
and the absence of any evidence of willingness or intent to pay
the debt or establish a realistic plan to pay the debt.
(c) a history of not meeting financial obligations;
(d) deceptive or illegal financial practices such as embezzlement,
employee theft, check fraud, income tax evasion, expense account
fraud, filing deceptive loan statements, and other intentional financial
breaches of trust;
(e) consistent spending beyond one's means, which may be indicated
by excessive indebtedness, significant negative cash flow, high
debt-to-income ratio, and/or other financial analysis;
(f) financial problems that are linked to drug abuse, alcoholism,
gambling problems, or other issues of security concern;
(g) failure to file annual Federal, state, or local income tax
returns as required or the fraudulent filing of the same;
(h) unexplained affluence, as shown by a lifestyle or standard
of living, increase in net worth, or money transfers that cannot
be explained by subject's known legal sources of income;
(i) compulsive or addictive gambling as indicated by an unsuccessful
attempt to stop gambling, "chasing losses" (i.e. increasing
the bets or returning another day in an effort to get even), concealment
of gambling losses, borrowing money to
fund gambling or pay gambling debts, family conflict or other problems
caused by gambling.
20. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred
under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not
cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness,
or good judgment;
(b) the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were
largely beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a
business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce
or separation), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances;
(c) the person has received or is receiving counseling for the
problem and/or there are clear indications that the problem is being
resolved or is under control;
(d) the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue
creditors or otherwise resolve debts;
(e) the individual has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy
of the past-due debt which is the cause of the problem and provides
documented proof to substantiate the basis of the dispute or provides
evidence of actions to resolve the issue;
(f) the affluence resulted from a legal source of income.
GUIDELINE G: ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION
21. The Concern. Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the
exercise of questionable judgment or the failure to control impulses,
and can raise questions about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness.
22. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
include:
(a) alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while
under the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, disturbing
the peace, or other incidents of concern, regardless of whether
the individual is diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent;
(b) alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for work
or duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition, or drinking on
the job, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an
alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent;
(c) habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired
judgment, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an
alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent;
(d) diagnosis by a duly qualified medical professional (e.g., physician,
clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of alcohol abuse or alcohol
dependence;
(e) evaluation of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence by a licensed
clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol
treatment program;
(f) relapse after diagnosis of alcohol abuse or dependence and
completion of an alcohol rehabilitation program;
(g) failure to follow any court order regarding alcohol education,
evaluation, treatment, or abstinence.
23. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) so much time has passed, or the behavior was so infrequent,
or it happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely
to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b) the individual acknowledges his or her alcoholism or issues
of alcohol abuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome
this problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence (if alcohol
dependent) or responsible use (if an alcohol abuser);
(c) the individual is a current employee who is participating in
a counseling or treatment program, has no history of previous treatment
and relapse, and is making satisfactory progress;
(d) the individual has successfully completed inpatient or outpatient
counseling or rehabilitation along with any required aftercare,
has demonstrated a clear and established pattern of modified consumption
or abstinence in accordance with treatment recommendations, such
as participation in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar
organization and has received a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified
medical professional or a licensed clinical social worker who is
a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment program.
GUIDELINE H: DRUG INVOLVEMENT
24. The Concern. Use of an illegal drug or misuse of a prescription
drug can raise questions about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness,
both because it may impair judgment and because it raises questions
about a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules,
and regulations.
(a) Drugs are defined as mood and behavior altering substances,
and include:
(1) Drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds identified and
listed in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended (e.g.,
marijuana or cannabis, depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and hallucinogens),
and
(2) inhalants and other similar substances;
(b) drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug
in a manner that deviates from approved medical direction.
25. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
include:
(a) any drug abuse (see above definition);
(b) testing positive for illegal drug use;
(c) illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing,
manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of drug
paraphernalia;
(d) diagnosis by a duly qualified medical professional (e.g., physician,
clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of drug abuse or drug dependence;
(e) evaluation of drug abuse or drug dependence by a licensed clinical
social worker who, is a staff member of a recognized drug treatment
program;
(f) failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program prescribed
by a duly qualified medical professional;
(g) any illegal drug use after being granted a security clearance;
(h) expressed intent to continue illegal drug use, or failure to
clearly and convincingly commit to discontinue drug use.
26. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened
under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not
cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness,
or good judgment;
(b) a demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future,
such as:
(1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts;
(2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used;
(3) an appropriate period of abstinence;
(4) a signed statement of intent with automatic revocation of clearance
for any violation;
(c) abuse of prescription drugs was after a severe or prolonged
illness during which these drugs were prescribed, and abuse has
since ended;
(d) satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment program,
including but not limited to rehabilitation and aftercare requirements,
without recurrence of abuse, and a favorable prognosis by a duly
qualified medical professional.
GUIDELINE I: PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS
27. The Concern. Certain emotional, mental, and personality conditions
can impair judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness. A formal diagnosis
of a disorder is not required for there to be a concern under this
guideline. A duly qualified mental health professional (e.g., clinical
psychologist or psychiatrist) employed by, or acceptable to and
approved by the U.S. Government, should be consulted when evaluating
potentially disqualifying and mitigating information under this
guideline. No negative inference concerning the standards in this
Guideline may be raised solely on the basis of seeking mental health
counseling.
28. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
include:
(a) behavior that casts doubt on an individual's judgment, reliability,
or trustworthiness that is not covered under any other guideline,
including but not limited to emotionally unstable, irresponsible,
dysfunctional, violent, paranoid, or bizarre behavior;
(b) an opinion by a duly qualified mental health professional that
the individual has a condition not covered under any other guideline
that may impair judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness;'
(c) the individual has failed to follow treatment advice related
to a diagnosed emotional, mental, or personality condition, e.g.,
failure to take prescribed medication.
29. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) the identified condition is readily controllable with treatment,
and the individual has demonstrated ongoing and consistent compliance
with the treatment plan;
(b) the individual has voluntarily entered a counseling or treatment
program for a condition that is amenable to treatment, and the individual
is currently receiving counseling or treatment with a favorable
prognosis by a duly qualified mental health professional;
(c) recent opinion by a duly qualified mental health professional
employed by, or acceptable to and approved by the U.S. Government
that an individual's previous condition is under control or in remission,
and has a low probability of recurrence or exacerbation;
(d) the past emotional instability was a temporary condition (e.g.,
one caused by death, illness, or marital breakup), the situation
has been resolved, and the individual no longer shows indications
of emotional instability;
(e) there is no indication of a current problem.
GUIDELINE J: CRIMINAL CONDUCT
30. The Concern. Criminal activity creates doubt about a person's
judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. By its very nature,
it calls into question a person's ability or willingness to comply
with laws, rules and regulations.
31. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
include:
(a) a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses;
(b) discharge or dismissal from the Armed Forces under dishonorable
conditions;)
(c) allegation or admission of criminal conduct, regardless of
whether the person was formally charged, formally prosecuted or
convicted;
(d) individual is currently on parole or probation;
e) violation of parole or probation, or failure to complete a court-mandated
rehabilitation program;
(f) conviction in a Federal or State court, including a court-martial
of a crime, sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding one year
and incarcerated as a result of that sentence for not less than
a year.
32. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) so much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior happened,
or it happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely
to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability,
trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b) the person was pressured or coerced into committing the act
and those pressures are no longer present in the person's life;
(c) evidence that the person did not commit the offense;
(d) there is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including but
not limited to the passage of time without recurrence of criminal
activity, remorse or restitution, job training or higher education,
good employment record, or constructive community involvement;
(e) potentially disqualifying conditions (b) and (f) above, may
not be mitigated unless, where meritorious circumstances exist,
the Secretaries of the Military Departments or designee; or the
Directors of Washington Headquarters Services (WHS), Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Office of
Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) or designee, has granted a waiver.
GUIDELINE K: HANDLING PROTECTED INFORMATION
33. The Concern. Deliberate or negligent failure to comply with
rules and regulations for protecting classified or other sensitive
information raises doubt about an individual's trustworthiness,
judgment, reliability, or willingness and ability to safeguard such
information, and is a serious security concern.
34. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
include:
(a) deliberate or negligent disclosure of classified or other protected
information to unauthorized persons, including but not limited to
personal or business contacts, to the media, or to persons present
at seminars, meetings, or conferences;
(b) collecting or storing classified or other protected information
at home or in any other unauthorized location;
(c) loading, drafting, editing, modifying, storing, transmitting,
or otherwise handling classified reports, data, or other information
on any unapproved equipment including but not limited to any typewriter,
word processor, or computer hardware, software, drive, system, gameboard,
handheld, "palm" or pocket device or other adjunct equipment;
(d) inappropriate efforts to obtain or view classified or other
protected information outside one's need to know;
(e) copying classified or other protected information in a manner
designed to conceal or remove classification or other document control
markings;
(f) viewing or downloading information from a secure system when
the information is beyond the individual's need-to-know;
(g) any failure to comply with rules for the protection of classified
or other sensitive information;
(h) negligence or lax security habits that persist despite counseling
by management.
(i) failure to comply with rules or regulations that results in
damage to the National Security, regardless of whether it was deliberate
or negligent.
35. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) so much time has elapsed since the behavior, or it has happened
so infrequently or under such unusual circumstances, that it is
unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's current
reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b) the individual responded favorably to counseling or remedial
security training and now demonstrates a positive attitude toward
the discharge of security responsibilities;
(c) the security violations were due to improper or inadequate
training.
GUIDELINE L: OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES
36. The Concern. Involvement in certain types of outside employment
or activities is of security concern if it poses a conflict of interest
with an individual's security responsibilities and could create
an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
37. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
include:
(a) any employment or service, whether compensated or volunteer,
with:
(1) the government of a foreign country;
(2) any foreign national, organization, or other entity;
(3) a representative of any foreign interest;
(4) any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person
engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on intelligence,
defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology;
(b) failure to report or fully disclose an outside activity when
this is required.
38. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) evaluation of the outside employment or activity by the appropriate
security or counterintelligence office indicates that it does not
pose a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities or
with the national security interests of the United States;
(b) the individual terminated the employment or discontinued the
activity upon being notified that it was in conflict with his or
her security responsibilities.
GUIDELINE M: USE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS
39. The Concern. Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines
or regulations pertaining to information technology systems may
raise security concerns about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness,
calling into question the willingness or ability to properly protect
sensitive systems, networks, and information. Information Technology
Systems include all related computer hardware, software, firmware,
and data used for the communication, transmission, processing, manipulation,
storage, or protection of information.
40. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
include:
(a) illegal or unauthorized entry into any information technology
system or component thereof;
(b) illegal or unauthorized modification, destruction, manipulation
or denial of access to information, software, firmware, or hardware
in an information technology system;
(c) use of any information technology system to gain unauthorized
access to another system or to a compartmented area within the same
system;
(d) downloading, storing, or transmitting classified information
on or to any unauthorized software, hardware, or information technology
system;
(e) unauthorized use of a government or other information technology
system;
(f) introduction, removal, or duplication of hardware, firmware,
software, or media to or from any information technology system
without authorization, when prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines
or regulations;
(g) negligence or lax security habits in handling information technology
that persist despite counseling by management;
(h) any misuse of information technology, whether deliberate or
negligent, that results in damage to the national security.
41. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
(a) so much time has elapsed since the behavior happened, or it
happened under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to
recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness,
or good judgment;
(b) the misuse was minor and done only in the interest of organizational
efficiency and effectiveness, such as letting another person use
one's password or computer when no other timely alternative was
readily available;
(c) the conduct was unintentional or inadvertent and was followed
by a prompt, good-faith effort to correct the situation and by notification
of supervisor.
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